Lecture 12: Encryption in Practice

6.1600 - Fall 2022

MIT

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Plan

* File encryption
* Encrypted streams: TLS
* Encrypted messaging

Theme: Gap between properties that apps want & properties that standard schemes provide.

Logistics

- Midterm 10/26
- OH Monday 3-4pm 32-G970

Recap: Encryption

* Weak (CPA-secure) enc, fixed-len msgs, shared key

Counter mode

* " " " var-len msgs "

Enc-then-MAC

* Strong (CCA-secure) enc, " "

DH key Exchange

* " " " " " Without a shared key

Today: Applications

Next time: Privacy/Crypto problems that encryption doesn't solve.

Surprise!?

→ With CRHFs, MACs, Signatures
AE, DH, PKE

you have the tools to understand essentially every widely used cryptographic protocol.* (exception, OTA, lattices, blockchain, ...)

→ There really are not that many primitives in use in our systems.

BUT: As you'll see, the design/specs are still very complicated. (TLS 1.3 = 160 pages)

Why?

↳ Extra security & functionality properties

↳ less often, but sometimes: Sloppy design

↳ Also, you'll see rules violated → often attacks

File Encryption

↳ Essentially what we've already seen.

↳ Bottom line: Use authenticated encryption AES-GCM

Example: WhatsApp Encrypted Backup
(msgs, contact, ...)

- Phone picks a secret AES key k
- ct = AES-GCM(k, data)
  ↳ sent to WhatsApp
- User saves key k (64 hex digits)

[There's a more complicated option that encrypts using a password.... uses hardware security device ... more complicated.

↳ Will discuss in context of iPhone]

Even file encryption can be tricky...

(See pdf-insecurity.org)

Example: PDF v1.5

* PDF format allows password-encrypting some/all pages of doc — uses Hash(passwd) as AES key.
* PDF supports submitting form to external server via HTTP
* PDF forms can reference objects in doc
* PDF supports submit form on event (open, click, close)

→ Each seems fine on its own but together they allow an attacker to learn encrypted data.



Moral?

* As soon as you depart from the standard simple thing, you open the door to all sorts of subtle attacks...

* Auth'ing control info/metadata is as important as auth'ing the data itself.

What would have prevented this attack?
- MAC over entire PDF?
- Compatible w/ wanting to be able to load one page at a time?
  - ↳ Maybe Merkle tree over pages & MAC on root.



Stream Encryption: TLS { Transport Layer Security (Formerly SSL)

Vision:



* Uses certificate-based pub key infrastructure to map domain name (mit.edu) → sig verif public key.

When you use HTTPS, SMTPS, IMAPS, ... you are running the original protocol (e.g. HTTP) over TLS.

* Seems simple! Very hard to get right...
  Many attacks & patches since first versions.
  MORAL: Use TLS 1.3 — don't try it yourself.

Why is this hard?

- Version/protocol negotiation — client and server may support different algs, protocols
  ↳ Downgrade attacks



- More complex protocol → more complex security goals
- FEATURES! Everyone wants to add something extra (e.g. client certificate auth at MIT)

Structure of TLS (v1.3)

I. Handshake (key exchange)



II. Record protocol



TLS Handshake: Properties

{ There are eight in the RFC!

* Correctness
* Security — adv "learns nothing" about session key → we saw this before
* Peer authentication — each party believes they're talking to the other
* Downgrade protection — parameters chosen should be the same w/ if no attacker
* Forward secrecy w.r.t. key compromise
  ↳ If attacker compromises client/server, it cannot decrypt past traffic.

N.B. Vanilla DH doesn't provide forward secrecy

* Protection vs. key compromise impersonation
* Protection of endpoint identities

TLS Handshake

*Grossly simplified!



- Why replay attacks isn't possible.
  - ↳ random values change every protocol run

- Why send server cert only after establishing shared DH secret?
  - ↳ Hides cert from passive network attacker (doesn't necessarily learn which Akamai-hosted site you're visiting)

- Why does this provide forward secrecy?
  - ↳ Only use long-term secrets to sign
  - ↳ Delete the DH secret keys after handshake completes.

[N.B. This doesn't protect past traffic against eavesdropper w/ big quantum comp.]

Key-Compromise Impersonation Attack

At MIT we use client certificates.

A bad way to do a handshake is this:



Problem: If attacker compromises Alice's secret key, attacker can pretend to be MIT to Alice.

- With sk_{Alice}, attacker can already make problems.
- But by impersonating MIT, attacker can trick Alice into sending more data. (passwd, etc.)

Properties that TLS doesn't provide

Authenticated EOF

- TLS makes data available to app as it arrives
- Needed for many uses (Youtube, etc.)
- But counterintuitive consequences:

```
curl https://sh.rustup.rs | sh
```

↳ `rm -rf /tmp/install...`

✂ CUT!

... what is the right thing to do here?

Hiding length of plaintext

Reasonable thing to do: gzip data before sending it to TLS (used to be standard).

Problem: Attacker controlled data often sent in same stream as secrets. Esp in web

CRIME Attack: Exploiting fact that TLS doesn't hide msg lengths

Goal: Steal user's Google cookie .... secret auth string sent with every request.



... Read cookie one byte at a time!

"Solution": Disable compression in TLS

...still affects HTTP

Moral: Use TLS 1.3 whenever you need "encrypted TLS".

Be aware of its pitfalls.

Encrypted Messaging

Think: Signal, WhatsApp, iMessage, ...



Why different from stream setting?

* "Connections" are long lived — for years
* Little data, few connections
* non-interactive — either party can be offline for long periods

Goals: Many as in TLS (though underspecified)

eg. Forward Secrecy

"Post-Compromise Security" — If attacker gets a snapshot of your device, will eventually not be able to read msg.

Not clear how relates to real-world threat

Unlike TLS, these apps typically rely on a centralized key server.

↳ to map [phone #] ⇒ [Public Key]

If someone compromises the key server, very weak protection against active attack.



* Phone can show you hash of claimed pk_{Bob} ... check manually. "No one" does this

* App can give warning when pk_{Bob} changes
  ↳ "Everyone" ignores this

↳ For sec-conscious users, maybe these suffice?

Toy Key Exchange



N.B. Server learns who is talking to whom.

Toy Ratchet – How to get forward secrecy and post-compromise security.



- An attacker who compromises device cannot recover past msgs
- Without persistent compromise, protocol will "heal" security

* Big advances in encrypted comms in last ~10 yrs
  - ↳ Before that: not much TLS, not much enc msging
* Next time: Open problems... what we haven't solved.