# 6.1600 Midterm 1 Review Session 

October 2023

## 1 Encryption Security Concepts

### 1.1 CPA Security

- Adversary gets $1^{n}$ where $n$ is the length of the key
- For $\operatorname{poly}(n)$ rounds, adversary gets access to the function $m \leftrightarrow E_{k}(m)$
- Adversary chooses pair of messages $\left\{m_{0}, m_{1}\right\}$, a secret $b$ is chosen at random from $\{0,1\}$, and adversary gets $c^{*}=E_{k}\left(m_{b}\right)$
- Adversary now gets another poly $(n)$ rounds of access to the functions $m \leftrightarrow E_{k}(m)$
- Adversary outputs $b^{\prime}$ and wins if $b^{\prime}=b$

Intuitively: Adversary cannot find out information about the plaintext even when given access access to encryption process.

### 1.2 CCA Security

An encryption scheem $(E, D)$ is CCA secure if every efficient adversary wins the followign game with probability at most $\frac{1}{2}+$ negligible.

- Adversary gets $1^{n}$ where $n$ is the length of the key
- For poly $(n)$ rounds, adversary gets access to the function $m \leftrightarrow E_{k}(m)$ and $c \leftrightarrow$ $D_{k}(c)$
- Adversary chooses pair of messages $\left\{m_{0}, m_{1}\right\}$, a secret $b$ is chosen at random from $\{0,1\}$, and adversary gets $c^{*}=E_{k}\left(m_{b}\right)$
- Adversary now gets another poly $(n)$ rounds of access to the functions $m \leftrightarrow E_{k}(m)$ and $c \leftrightarrow D_{k}(c)$ except that she is not allowed to query $c^{*}$ to her second oracle.
- Adversary outputs $b^{\prime}$ and wins if $b^{\prime}=b$

Intuitively: Adversary cannot find out information about plaintext even when given access to encryption and decryption process.

### 1.3 Encryption with Authentication

Encrypt then MAC is CCA secure. However, a few notes:

- Cannot use same key for encryption and MAC
- MAC then Encrypt is not CCA secure
- Need to MAC the entire ciphertext
- Cannot output some plaintext before verifying integrity

Intuitively: Encrypt then MAC gives us CCA security because we don't want our ciphertext to be tampered with. Hence, we need to ensure authentication.

### 1.4 Diffie-Hellman Protocol

Example of quick step through of the Diffie-Hellman protocol:

- Alice and Bob publicly agree to use modulus $p=23$ and $g=5$
- Alice chooses a secret integer $a=4$, then sends Bob $A=g^{a} \bmod p=4$
- Bob chooses a secret integer $b=3$, then sends Alice $B=g^{b} \bmod \mathrm{p}=10$
- Alice computes $s=B^{a} \bmod p=A^{b} \bmod p=18$, which becomes their shared secret.


### 1.5 Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Given $\left(g, g^{a}, g^{b}\right)$ for randomly chosen $a, b \in\{0, \ldots, q-1\}$, it is computationaly intractable to compute the value $g^{a b}$.

## 2 Terms you've Probably Heard

- Hash
- MAC
- Digital Signature
- AES
- PRF
- Symmetric Key
- Diffie-Hellman
- RSA
- CRHF
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography
- Collision Resistance
- PKI
- TLS


## 3 Problems with Encryption

- Cannot hide message lengths
- Padding
- Source is still known
- TOR
- Compromised server
- Private Information Retrieval

