

# 6.1600 Midterm 1 Review Session

October 2024

## 1 Encryption Security Concepts

### 1.1 CPA Security

- Adversary gets  $1^n$  where  $n$  is the length of the key
- For  $\text{poly}(n)$  rounds, adversary gets access to the function  $m \leftrightarrow E_k(m)$
- Adversary chooses pair of messages  $\{m_0, m_1\}$ , a secret  $b$  is chosen at random from  $\{0, 1\}$ , and adversary gets  $c^* = E_k(m_b)$
- Adversary now gets another  $\text{poly}(n)$  rounds of access to the functions  $m \leftrightarrow E_k(m)$
- Adversary outputs  $b'$  and wins if  $b' = b$

Intuitively: Adversary cannot find out information about the plaintext even when given access access to encryption process.

### 1.2 CCA Security

An encryption scheme  $(E, D)$  is CCA secure if every efficient adversary wins the followign game with probability at most  $\frac{1}{2} + \text{negligible}$ .

- Adversary gets  $1^n$  where  $n$  is the length of the key
- For  $\text{poly}(n)$  rounds, adversary gets access to the function  $m \leftrightarrow E_k(m)$  and  $c \leftrightarrow D_k(c)$
- Adversary chooses pair of messages  $\{m_0, m_1\}$ , a secret  $b$  is chosen at random from  $\{0, 1\}$ , and adversary gets  $c^* = E_k(m_b)$
- Adversary now gets another  $\text{poly}(n)$  rounds of access to the functions  $m \leftrightarrow E_k(m)$  and  $c \leftrightarrow D_k(c)$  except that she is not allowed to query  $c^*$  to her second oracle.
- Adversary outputs  $b'$  and wins if  $b' = b$

Intuitively: Adversary cannot find out information about plaintext even when given access to encryption and decryption process.

### 1.3 Encryption with Authentication

Encrypt then MAC is CCA secure. However, a few notes:

- Cannot use same key for encryption and MAC
- MAC then Encrypt is not CCA secure
- Need to MAC the entire ciphertext
- Cannot output some plaintext before verifying integrity

Intuitively: Encrypt then MAC gives us CCA security because we don't want our ciphertext to be tampered with. Hence, we need to ensure authentication.

### 1.4 Diffie-Hellman Protocol

Example of quick step through of the Diffie-Hellman protocol:

- Alice and Bob publicly agree to use modulus  $p = 23$  and  $g = 5$
- Alice chooses a secret integer  $a = 4$ , then sends Bob  $A = g^a \bmod p = 4$
- Bob chooses a secret integer  $b = 3$ , then sends Alice  $B = g^b \bmod p = 10$
- Alice computes  $s = B^a \bmod p = A^b \bmod p = 18$ , which becomes their shared secret.

### 1.5 Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Given  $(g, g^a, g^b)$  for randomly chosen  $a, b \in \{0, \dots, q-1\}$ , it is computationally intractable to compute the value  $g^{ab}$ .

## 2 Terms you've Probably Heard

- Hash
- MAC
- Digital Signature
- AES
- PRF
- Symmetric Key
- Diffie-Hellman
- RSA
- CRHF
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography
- Collision Resistance
- PKI
- TLS

### 3 Problems with Encryption

- Cannot hide message lengths
  - Padding
- Source is still known
  - TOR
- Compromised server
  - Private Information Retrieval